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INTRODUCTION 
 
Data breaches are an increasingly common occurrence and a 
growing social issue. Several large corporations were hit with, or 
settled, large lawsuits related to data breaches, including Home Depot 
and Lamps Plus, Inc., in March 2016 alone. On March 8, 2016, Home 
Depot agreed to settle consumers’ class action claims from a 2014 data 
breach for $13 million, in addition to funding identity protection 
services and implementing new data security measures.1 Lamps Plus, 
Inc., was sued on March 29 for failure to protect the information of an 
estimated 1,300 workers following a recent target by hackers who 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; M.A., Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies, University of 
Texas at Austin, 2010; M.P.Aff., Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, 
2010; B.A., Slavic Studies, Brown University, 2007. 
1 Allison Grande, Home Depot to Pay $13M to End Consumers’ Breach 
Claims, LAW360 (April 16, 2016), 
http://www.law360.com/classaction/articles/768679?nl_pk=4123bead-428e-49d0-
89dbace96bab2b1c&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=
classaction. 
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allegedly stole employee IRS information.2 As of April 26, 2016, there 
have been 315 data breaches in the United States, affecting over 11.3 
million records.3 
In July 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
addressed Article III standing of consumers who were harmed by a 
data breach.4 In that case, customers brought a lawsuit against Neiman 
Marcus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 
alleging present injuries and increased risk of future harm following a 
2013 data breach by hackers.5 Plaintiffs alleged present injuries 
including loss of time and money related to resolving fraudulent 
charges and protecting against future risks, financial losses for 
purchases plaintiffs would not have otherwise made, and loss of 
control over private information.6  
The district court held that the Plaintiffs did not adequately allege 
injury sufficient to establish Article III standing and granted 
Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing.7 While the district 
court found that the threat of future harm was imminent, the injuries 
inflicted by unauthorized credit card charges did not “qualify as 
‘concrete’ injuries.”8 The complaint did not contain allegations 
regarding the costs incurred to mitigate the risk of future fraudulent 
charges, and the court noted that the general responses to a fraudulent 
charge, including issuance of a new credit card and possibly a period 
                                                 
2 Kurt Orzeck, Lamps Plus Hit With Employee Class Action Data Breach, 
LAW360, (April 28, 2016),  
http://www.law360.com/classaction/articles/777931?nl_pk=4123bead-428e-49d0-
89db-ace96bab2b1c&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign 
=classaction. 
3 Data Breach Reports, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, at 4 (May 24, 
2016), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/DataBreachReports_2016.pdf. 
4 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015). 
5 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, No. 14 C 1735, 2014 WL 4627893, at 
*1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014), rev’d and remanded, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at *1, *5. 
8 Id. at *3. 
2
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of time where one has to wait for the new card, are de minimis injuries 
and ultimately insufficient to confer standing.9 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision.10 The Seventh Circuit considered the injuries Plaintiffs 
alleged and found that the Supreme Court’s holding in Clapper did not 
“foreclose any use whatsoever of future injuries to support Article III 
standing.”11 Citing to a district court case with similar facts where the 
court found Article III standing,12 the Remijas court held that injuries 
associated with resolving fraudulent charges and protecting oneself 
against identity theft were sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact 
requirement for Article III standing.13 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held 
that the Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were sufficient to establish 
standing.14 
Part I of this article discusses data breaches and their costs to 
society. Part II provides a summary of Article III standing doctrine at 
the Supreme Court more generally and at the federal appellate court 
level in cases involving data breaches. Part III reviews the factual and 
procedural context of Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, as well 
as the district court and Seventh Circuit holdings. Finally, Part IV 
argues that the Seventh Circuit’s finding of Article III standing is 
proper and consistent with approaches both by the Supreme Court and 
those adopted by other federal courts of appeal. 
 
WHAT IS A DATA BREACH? 
 
According to the Congressional Research Service, “[a] data 
security breach occurs when there is a loss or theft of, or unauthorized 
access to, sensitive personally identifiable information that could 
result in the potential compromise of the confidentiality or integrity of 
                                                 
9 Id. at *4. 
10 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2015). 
11 Id. at 693. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 696. 
14 Id. at 697. 
3
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data.”15 Data breach causes include: “computer hacking, malware, 
payment card fraud, employee insider breach, physical loss of non-
electronic records and portable devices, and inadvertent exposure of 
confidential data on websites or in e-mail.”16 The most frequent cause 
of data breaches is malicious or criminal attack, accounting for 47% of 
data breaches globally in FY 2015.17 
Data breach costs also continue to increase.18 According to the 
Ponemon Institute, a research center dedicated to privacy and data 
protection, the average per capita cost of data breaches in the United 
States in FY 2015 was $217, the highest in the world, which was an 
increase from $207 in FY 2014 and $188 in FY 2013.19 The average 
total organizational cost of data breaches in FY 2015 was $6.5 million, 
an increase of over $1 million since FY 2013.20 The Institute 
calculates data breach costs from both direct and indirect expenses. 
“Direct expenses include engaging forensic experts, outsourcing 
hotline support and providing free credit monitoring subscriptions and 
discounts for future products and services. Indirect costs include in-
house investigations and communication, as well as the extrapolated 
value of customer loss resulting from turnover or diminished customer 
acquisition rates.”21  
In 2013, the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, 
and Trade held a hearing on data breaches, entitled “Reporting Data 
                                                 
15 GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42475, DATA SECURITY BREACH 
NOTIFICATION LAWS 2 (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42475.pdf. 
16 Id. 
17 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis, PONEMON INST., 10 (May 
2015). Malicious and criminal attacks account for negligent insiders, individuals 
who cause a breach because of carelessness, and malicious attacks caused by hackers 
or criminal insiders, attacks include malware infections, criminal insiders, 
phishing/social engineering, and SQL injection. Id. 
18 Id. at 10. 
19 Id. at 2–5.  
20 Id. at 7. 
21 Id. at 4. 
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Breaches: Is Federal Legislation Needed to Protect Consumers?”22  
During the hearing, Representatives heard about data breach trends 
and the need for federal legislation to protect consumers.23 There 
currently exists a patchwork of state laws with no federally mandated 
notification regime, costing businesses more than an estimated $100 
billion to comply.24 
Given the costs and frequency of data breaches, millions of 
Americans are at risk of having their personal information stolen. The 
question becomes, once a person’s personal information is 
compromised in a data breach, does the victim have any legal 
recourse? Varying judicial interpretation of Article III Section 2 Clause 
1 of the U.S. Constitution provides an unclear answer to this question, 
as without Article III standing, data breach victims cannot have their 
claims heard in federal court. 
 
ARTICLE III STANDING 
 
Article III Section 2 Clause 1 outlines the jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts.25 Article III’s case-or-controversy doctrines, including 
standing, mootness, ripeness, and political question, concern “the 
constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, 
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.”26 The Supreme 
Court has set forth that Article III standing is arguably the “most 
important” of the case-or-controversy doctrines.27 “[S]tanding is an 
essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement 
                                                 
22 Press Release, The Energy and Commerce Committee, 
Subcommittee Explores State of Data Breaches in United States (July, 18 
2013), https://energycommerce.house.gov/news-center/press-
releases/subcommittee-explores-state-data-breaches-united-states.  
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 U.S. CONST. art. III.  
26 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 
699 F.2d 1166, 1178–79 (1983) (Bork, J., concurring)). 
27 Id. 
5
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of Article III.”28 The Court has always required that a litigant have 
“standing”, which “subsumes a blend of constitutional requirements 
and prudential considerations.”29 Until a court determines that a 
litigant has standing, “the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.”30 
For example, federal courts do not have jurisdiction to declare a statute 
void unless matters before them involve “litigants in actual 
controversies.”31  
The Supreme Court has established that in order to find that the 
“irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” has been met, the 
plaintiff must prove the three elements.32 The first element, injury, 
requires that the plaintiff have suffered “injury in fact”, which is “an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized . . . and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical.’”33 The second element, causation, requires a causal 
connection between the injury and the “conduct complained of.”34 The 
third element, redressability, requires that it must be likely, and not just 
speculative, that the court can redress the injury.35 The burden is on 
the party invoking jurisdiction to establish the three elements.36 
While the Court has not yet addressed Article III standing in 
connection to a data breach, several recent cases have had and will 
have an impact on current and future data breach cases. In Clapper v. 
Amnesty International USA, the Court found that plaintiffs lacked 
standing in a case involving the federal government’s wiretapping 
                                                 
28 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
29 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). 
30 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) 
(quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)). 
31 Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Comm’rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39 
(1885). 
32 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 179 (2000). 
33 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 561. 
36 Id. 
6
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program.37 The Court held that “threatened injury must be certainly 
impending” in order to satisfy the injury in fact requirement.38 Most 
recently, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Court held that the Ninth 
Circuit had not properly analyzed the concreteness of a consumer’s 
injury, one of the prongs of the injury in fact requirement,39 and 
otherwise urged that “bare procedural violation(s)” are likely not 
enough to constitute injury in fact.40 At the federal appellate court 
level, data privacy, an implicit concern involved in assessing injuries 
from a data breach, is currently up before the Sixth Circuit in a case 
involving inaccurate information a credit reporting agency released to 
a consumer’s potential employer.41  
The following sections will detail Supreme Court precedent on 
Article III standing more generally followed by Article III standing in 
lower court cases involving data breaches. The section on Supreme 
Court precedent includes an analysis of Spokeo, which, though it was 
decided after Remijas, did not substantively alter long-standing 
principles of Article III standing,42 and creates no conflict with the 
Seventh Circuit’s analysis and holding in Remijas.  
 
A.  Article III Standing and Supreme Court Precedent 
 
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court held that the 
“irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” contains the 
following three elements: (1) injury in fact, which is the invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is both concrete and particularized and 
actual or imminent; (2) “a causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of”; and (3) likelihood that the injury can be 
                                                 
37 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013). 
38 Id. at 1147. 
39 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016). 
40 Id. at 1544. 
41 See Smith v. LexisNexis Screening Solutions, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 651 (E.D. 
Mich. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 15-2330 (6th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015). 
42 See, e.g., Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement at 2 n.1, 
Chapman v. Dowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vician, P.C., No. 2:15-CV-120 JD, 2016 
WL 3247872 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 29, 2015), at *1 n.1. 
7
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redressed through a favorable decision.43 For the purposes of 
establishing standing at the pleading stage, “general factual allegations 
of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice.”44 The 
plaintiff bears the burden of proof, and “each element must be 
supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff 
bears the burden of proof.”45  
Plaintiffs in Lujan were wildlife conservation and environmental 
organizations who sued the Secretary of the Interior and requested the 
following: first, a declaratory judgment that an agency regulation was 
in error as to its geographic scope, and second, an injunction requiring 
that a new regulation be promulgated.46 While the district court 
granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the 
Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that plaintiffs had 
adequately pled injury in fact.47  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and 
held that plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged an injury as a result of 
the defendant’s actions.48 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, urged 
a higher threshold for standing and invalidated a congressional grant 
of standing for the first time because of the absence of sufficient injury 
in fact.49 Injury in fact required more than a cognizable interest; it 
required that the parties seeking review have themselves been 
injured.50 Plaintiffs argued that they had suffered injury in fact because 
agency-funded projects would eliminate endangered species in 
locations plaintiffs intended to visit, but these arguments “[did] not 
support a finding of ‘actual or imminent’ injury that [Supreme Court] 
                                                 
43 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
44 Id. at 561. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 558–59. 
47 Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals & Their Environment v. Hodel, 
851 F.2d 1035, 1041 (8th Cir. 1988) 
48 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562. 
49 Seth F. Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance”: Intangible Injury in Fact in 
the Information Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 749-50 (2016). 
50 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–63. 
8
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cases require.”51 The Court held that standing requires “a factual 
showing of perceptible harm.”52 Lujan emphasized that concreteness 
is essential to the injury in fact requirement.53 
Shortly after Lujan was decided, the Supreme Court ruled 
unanimously against the government in a case involving the IRS’s 
allegedly illicit acquisition of tapes involving conversations between 
the Church of Scientology members and its attorneys.54 In that case, 
the Los Angeles County Court Clerk released the tapes to the IRS, 
which the IRS had requested in connection with an investigation into 
the tax returns of L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of 
Scientology.55 Given the physical delivery of the tapes, the United 
States argued that the Church had “lost its claim to avoid a threatened 
injury in fact.”56 The Court held that the taxpayer was still suffering 
injury as a result of the Government’s possession of the tapes in the 
form of an “affront to the taxpayer’s privacy.”57 Though the case was 
centered on the question of mootness under Article III, not standing, 
the case reveals that the Court found injury in fact where personal 
information is concerned.  This suggests that conferring standing for a 
breach in which such information is stolen and subject to fraud, when 
there is a strong possibility for future fraudulent conduct, is not 
contrary to the Court’s holding. 
More recently, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the 
Court held that attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media 
organizations did not have standing because they alleged future harm 
that was not “certainly impending.”58 The plaintiffs challenged the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 
                                                 
51 Id. at 564. 
52 Id. at 566. 
53 Id. at 578. 
54 Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S., 506 U.S. 9, 10 (1992). 
55 Id. 
56 Kreimer, supra note 49, at 760 (citing Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 
10). 
57 Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 13. 
58 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013). 
9
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2008, 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a), which permitted the Government to target 
and surveil communications of non-U.S. citizens abroad.59 Plaintiffs 
regularly communicated with colleagues and clients abroad, and they 
alleged that the new law forced them to undertake costly measures to 
protect the confidentiality of their communications.60 The Court held 
that plaintiffs suffered self-inflicted injuries and “subjective fear of 
surveillance,” neither of which gave rise to standing.61 In its analysis, 
the Court also rejected an alternative argument that present measures 
taken to prevent future harm could constitute an injury sufficient to 
confer standing.62 
The Court focused on an injury’s imminence, conceding that it 
was “a somewhat elastic concept,” but that in order to satisfy the 
element of imminence, the injury must be “certainly impending.”63 
Allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient to be considered 
“certainly impending.”64 The Court held that plaintiffs rested their 
theory of standing on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities,” 
including: (1) the Government would imminently target their 
communications; (2) the Government would invoke its surveillance 
authority under § 1881a; (3) Article III judges would approve the 
Government’s surveillance plan; (4) the Government would intercept 
communications from respondents’ contacts; and (5) the Government 
would intercept respondents’ communications.65 This “speculative 
chain of possibilities” did not establish that injury based on future 
surveillance was “certainly impending” or fairly traceable to section 
1881(a).66 
                                                 
59 Id. at 1144; 50 USCA § 1881a. 
60 Id. at 1144-45. 
61 Id. 1152–53. 
62 Id. at 1143. 
63 Id. at 1147 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 
(1992). 
64 Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990).  
65 Id. at 1148–50. 
66 Id. at 1150. 
10
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Plaintiffs also argued in the alternative that they were suffering 
present injuries by taking measures to avoid section 1881(a) 
surveillance.67 The Court rejected this theory of standing as well, 
holding that the Second Circuit had improperly “water[ed] down the 
fundamental requirements of Article III” by allowing that the present 
costs incurred by taking protective measures were sufficient for 
standing as long as they were not “fanciful, paranoid, or otherwise 
unreasonable.”68 
Justice Breyer wrote for the dissent and argued that the harm 
alleged was not “speculative” and was “as likely to take place as are 
most future events that commonsense inference and ordinary 
knowledge of human nature tell us will happen.”69 Given that all 
agreed that interception of the phone calls or emails would qualify as 
“concrete and particularized” injury, and a favorable judgment by the 
Court would redress the injury by declaring the statute 
unconstitutional, the principle issue was whether the interception of 
the communications was an injury that was “actual or imminent.”70 
The dissent argued that the case law suggested that the Constitution 
did not require that injury be an absolute certainty, but rather a 
“reasonable” or “high probability.”71 Notwithstanding their 
disagreement, both the majority and dissent conceded that an actual 
interception would constitute an injury sufficient to confer standing. 
Though the Court did not find injury in fact in Clapper, the Court 
has ruled in favor of plaintiffs whose “legitimate expectations of 
privacy” have been violated.72 Relevant cases involving intangible 
acquisition of private information have created a potential Fourth 
Amendment violation, including in cases involving thermal imaging, 
                                                 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 1151. 
69 Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
70 Id. at 1155–56. 
71 Id. at 1165. 
72 Kreimer, supra note 49, at 758 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
353 (1967) (ruling that the “presence or absence of a physical intrusion” cannot be a 
meaningful distinction in Fourth Amendment cases)). 
11
Linehan: Is the Injury Real?: The Seventh Circuit Extends Article III Stan
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2016
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 11, Issue 2                        Spring 2016 
 
157 
 
analysis of blood and urine samples, analysis of information in cell 
phones seized upon arrest, and GPS monitoring.73 Intangible 
intrusions on privacy are enough to create constitutional violations, 
and therefore, it is not unreasonable that the unquestioned theft of 
personal information in a data breach may qualify as injurious enough 
for the purposes of standing. 
Finally, in its most recent term, the Court decided Spokeo, another 
case involving concreteness and the injury in fact requirement.74 In 
Spokeo, the case before the Court involved an action brought by a 
consumer under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) against a 
website operator for publishing an inaccurate consumer report about 
him. In a 6−2 decision, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
and remanded, holding that the lower court’s standing analysis was 
incomplete and had “failed to fully appreciate the distinction between 
concreteness and particularization.”75 The Court expressed no opinion 
as to whether Robins had standing and remanded the question of the 
concreteness of Robins’ injury to the Ninth Circuit.   
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito stated that for an injury to 
be “concrete” it must “actually exist[,]”76 while also noting that an 
injury need not be tangible to exist.77 The Court permitted that 
procedural violations, such as a violation of the FCRA, might be 
sufficient to constitute an injury in fact, but a “bare procedural 
violation” such as “an incorrect zip code” would not cause concrete 
harm.78 The opinion has generated headlines, with both plaintiff and 
defense bars claiming that the opinion was a positive one for their 
                                                 
73 Id. at 758 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Ferguson 
v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 
2489–90 n.1 (2014)). 
74 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016). 
75 Id. at 1550. 
76 Id. at 1548. 
77 Id. at 1549. 
78 Id. at 1550. 
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respective sides of the aisle.79 Regardless of who benefited from 
Spokeo, it does not create conflict for the Remijas holding, in which 
the court adequately addressed both prongs of injury in fact, as the 
discussion infra will demonstrate.  While Spokeo does not provide any 
additional guidance to cases with similar facts to Remijas, the cases 
discussed in the next section, which deal with data breaches, or data 
privacy, provide more insight into the correctness of the Remijas 
court’s ruling. 
 
B.  Article III Standing and Data Breaches 
 
Though no federal appellate court prior to the Remijas court has 
ruled on any data breach cases which specifically involve fraudulent 
charges, courts have dealt with data breaches and varying allegations 
of injury. No case other than Remijas was decided after Clapper, 
however, and therefore, only the Seventh Circuit had occasion to 
interpret Clapper in a case involving a data breach. Other courts 
primarily relied on the Supreme Court’s enunciation of Article III 
standing in Lujan. 
In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit addressed alleged injuries from 
identity theft that resulted from a data breach in a case of first 
impression.80 The plaintiffs filed suit when a health care services 
corporation was burgled and two laptops containing sensitive and 
personal customer information was compromised.81 Resnick v. Avmed, 
Inc. was decided before Clapper, thus the court relied on Lujan, in 
which the Supreme Court held that “general factual allegations of 
injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice” to establish 
standing.82 Under that standard, the court quickly concluded that 
                                                 
79 Allison Grande, Spokeo Ruling Helps Both Sides of the Privacy Bar, Attys 
Say, LAW360 (May 25, 2016),  
http://www.law360.com/articles/800443/spokeo-ruling-helps-both-sides-of-privacy-
bar-attys-say. 
80 Resnick v. Avmed Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2012). 
81 Id. at 1322. 
82 Id. at 1323 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 
(1992)). 
13
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allegations of actual identity theft and monetary damages were injury 
in fact under the law.83 Though the Seventh Circuit did not cite 
Resnick in Remijas,84 the Resnick court’s conclusion that identity theft 
and monetary damages constituted injury in fact lends strength to the 
idea that a data breach that results in fraudulent charges has similarly 
pled an increased likelihood of identity theft and therefore injury in 
fact. 
In data breach cases before the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, both 
courts held that plaintiffs had sufficiently pled injury in fact to satisfy 
Article III standing. In Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, plaintiffs 
alleged that hackers who gained access to bank customers’ personal 
information had caused injury in fact. The Seventh Circuit relied on 
the reasoning of sister circuit courts85 and held that injury in fact “can 
be satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act which harms the 
plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm[,]” even if plaintiffs 
provide no proof of data misuse.86  
In Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., the Ninth Circuit relied on slightly 
different reasoning than the Seventh Circuit and held that if a plaintiff 
faces a credible threat of harm that is real and immediate, and not 
conjectural or hypothetical, then the plaintiff has met the injury in fact 
requirement for Article III standing.87 To formulate this test, the court 
relied on Ninth Circuit precedent and a Supreme Court case, City of 
Los Angeles v. Lyons.88 In Krottner, a laptop was stolen from 
Starbucks that contained the unencrypted personal information of 
97,000 employees.89 Following the theft, one of the plaintiffs was 
                                                 
83 Id.  
84 See generally Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 
2015). 
85 Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 
to opinions in the Second, Sixth, Ninth and Fourth Circuits, in which the courts held 
that threats of future harm conferred standing). 
86 Id. 
87 Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010). 
88 Id. (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Cent. 
Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 947, 950 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
89 Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1141. 
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notified by his bank that someone had tried to open an account in his 
name.90 Plaintiffs enrolled in free credit monitoring services and spent 
extra time monitoring their accounts.91 Given these facts, the court 
held that the theft created “real and immediate harm.”92 
In contrast, the Third Circuit ruled that data breach victims had 
not successfully pled injuries sufficient to find Article III standing.93 In 
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., plaintiffs were employees of companies 
which were customers of a payroll processing firm (Ceridian 
Corporation).94 A hacker infiltrated the company’s payment system 
and “potentially gained access to personal and financial information” 
of the company’s customer businesses.95 Though there was a security 
breach, the plaintiffs did not provide the court any proof that the 
hacker “read, copied, or understood the data,” and the court held that 
the allegations of future injury were therefore too hypothetical.96 The 
injuries alleged were even more speculative than those in Lujan, which 
the Supreme Court held were insufficient to confer standing.97 The 
court also distinguished the facts from those in Krottner and Pisciotta, 
finding that those cases involved “harms [that] were significantly more 
‘imminent’ and ‘certainly impending’ than the alleged harm here.”98 
With Remijas, the Seventh Circuit relied on more recent Supreme 
Court precedent, while adhering to the principles the cases above set 
out regarding the injury in fact requirement.  Per the holdings above, 
in data breach cases, evidence that hackers have misused information 
clearly makes a stronger case for conferring Article III standing. 
 
                                                 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 1143. 
93 Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41 (3d Cir. 2011). 
94 Id. at 40. 
95 Id. (emphasis added). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 42. 
98 Id. at 44. 
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REMIJAS V. NEIMAN MARCUS 
 
A.  Factual Background 
  
Neiman Marcus, a luxury department store, was attacked by 
hackers who stole customers’ credit card numbers during the holiday 
season in 2013.99 In December 2013, Neiman Marcus determined that 
as a result of the hack, some customers had fraudulent charges on their 
credit cards.100 Once Neiman Marcus learned of the fraudulent 
charges, the company investigated and found potential malware in its 
computer systems, which had attempted to collect customer card data 
between July 16, 2013 and October 30, 2013.101 The company 
announced on January 10, 2014, that it had determined that 
approximately 350,000 credit cards had been exposed to the hackers’ 
malware.102 Neiman Marcus then publicly disclosed the data breach 
and revealed that of those 350,000, 9200 cards were known to have 
been used fraudulently.103 Not only were credit card numbers exposed, 
but also social security numbers and birth dates.104 Neiman Marcus 
was not the only company to suffer security breaches during that 
holiday season.105  
Neiman Marcus notified its customers who had shopped at its 
stores between January 2013 and January 2014 and offered them “one 
year of free credit monitoring and identify theft protection.”106 
Following this announcement, on February 4, 2014, Michael Kingston, 
                                                 
99 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 689 (7th Cir. 2015). 
100 Id. at 689–90. 
101 Id. at 690. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Target and Michael’s were also targeted. See Christopher Budd, 
Information about recent retail data breaches in the United States: an FAQ, TREND 
MICRO: SIMPLY SECURITY, (last visited April 19, 2016), 
http://blog.trendmicro.com/information-recent-retail-data-breaches-united-states-
faq/. 
106 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690. 
16
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol11/iss2/3
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 11, Issue 2                        Spring 2016 
 
162 
 
Senior Vice President and Chief Information Officer, testified before 
the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, representing that the 
information that appeared to have been compromised was credit card 
information, with no indication that social security numbers or other 
private information had been compromised.107 Several lawsuits were 
filed, and these were consolidated into the complaint that gave rise to 
this case, Remijas v. Neiman Marcus. 
In the complaint, Hilary Remijas alleged that she made purchases 
at the Neiman Marcus in Oak Brook, Illinois, in August 2013 and 
December 2013.108  Melissa Frank, another named plaintiff, alleged 
that she used a joint debit card to make purchases at the Neiman 
Marcus in Long Island, New York in December 2013.109 Frank further 
alleged that she was a target of a scam through her cell phone and that 
her husband had received a letter about the breach from Neiman 
Marcus.110 The final named plaintiff, Joanne Kao, alleged that she 
made purchases on ten separate occasions over the course of 2013 at a 
Neiman Marcus store location in San Francisco, and that she received 
notifications about the breach from both Neiman Marcus and her 
bank.111 
 
B.  Procedural Background 
 
Hilary Remijas joined several other plaintiffs to file a class-action 
complaint against Neiman Marcus on June 2, 2014, seeking to 
represent themselves and the 350,000 other customers whose personal 
information may have been hacked. 112 The complaint relies on 
theories for relief that include “negligence, breach of implied contract, 
unjust enrichment, unfair and deceptive business practices, invasion of 
                                                 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 691. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 690; Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, No. 14 C 1735, 2014 
WL 4627893, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014). 
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privacy, and violation of multiple state data breach laws.”113 
Defendant, Neiman Marcus, moved to dismiss the complaint under 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of 
standing and failure to state a claim.114 The District Court granted the 
motion to dismiss on standing grounds.115  
 
C.  The District Court’s Decision 
 
District Judge Zagel analyzed the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries and 
held that plaintiffs had failed to plead Article III standing sufficiently. 
He noted that Article III standing is not “a mere pleading 
requirement,” but rather must be supported “with the manner and 
degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the 
litigation.”116 Plaintiffs alleged four principle categories of injury, and 
Judge Zagel was unpersuaded that any sufficiently supported Article 
III standing.117 
The first principle category of injury that Plaintiffs alleged was 
increased risk of future harm.118 Judge Zagel relied on three different 
cases where the court had previously addressed Article III standing in 
the context of cyber-attacks and analyzed how they interpreted the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Clapper.119 The courts in two 
previous cases, Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc.120 and In Re 
Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litigation121 held that “the alleged increased 
risk of future harm was insufficient to establish standing.”122 The 
                                                 
113 Id. at 690–91. 
114 Id. at 691. 
115 Id. 
116 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, No. 14 C 1735, 2014 WL 
4627893, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014). 
117 Id. at *5.  
118 Id. at *2. 
119 Id. 
120 No. 12 C 09115, 2014 WL 960816 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014). 
121 No. 12–cv–8617, 2013 WL 4759588 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013). 
122 Remijas, 2014 WL 4627893, at *2. 
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Strautins and Barnes & Noble court both relied on Clapper, which 
required “certainly impending” analysis with regard to the injury in 
fact element of standing.123 The Strautins court also argued that 
Clapper overruled previous Seventh Circuit precedent, which held that 
the “the injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat of future 
harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk 
of future harm that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the 
defendant’s actions.”124  
In another case, the alleged increased risk of future harm was 
sufficient to establish Article III standing.125 In Moyer v. Michael 
Stores, Inc., the court found that while Clapper established a 
heightened standard for standing analysis, such a standard was only 
appropriate for situations that called for more rigor—namely, national 
security and the Constitution.126 The court concluded that Clapper and 
Pisciotta could co-exist.127 
Judge Zagel noted that while a literal reading of Pisciotta might 
lead to the conclusion that any increase in risk of future harm would 
be sufficient to confer Article III standing, this was an improper 
reading.128 The standing threshold was therefore somewhere in the 
middle, requiring more than a mere increase of risk of harm, but less 
than Clapper’s heightened standard. Regarding the facts, Judge Zagel 
differentiated Pisciotta from Strautins and Barnes & Noble, as the 
plaintiffs’ data in Pisciotta was actually stolen, while the data in the 
latter two cases was only alleged to have possibly been stolen.129 
Given that the data in Pisciotta was actually stolen, Judge Zagel 
argued that the Pisciotta court’s holding satisfied the “certainly 
                                                 
123 Id. 
124 Id. (citing Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.2d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 
2007)).  
125 Moyer v. Michael Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 WL 3511500 at *4–5 
(N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at *2 (citing Moyer, 2014 WL 3511500, at *6).  
128 Id. 
129 Id. at *3. 
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impending” standard, while Strautins and Barnes & Noble, where data 
was only possible stolen, did not satisfy the standard.130 
Applying this understanding to Remijas, Judge Zagel held that the 
majority of Plaintiffs were only alleging that their data may have been 
stolen, which made the case more like Strautins and Barnes & 
Noble.131 Though Plaintiffs also alleged that 9200 of the 350,000 
customers had fraudulent charges appear on their credit cards, Judge 
Zagel held that this was not enough to prove an injury to confer 
standing.132 Judge Zagel determined that the fraudulent charges led to 
several inferences: (1) there was injury in fact, which could be inferred 
from the fact that 9200 customers had their data stolen, and (2) there 
was injury in fact that was “certainly impending” for the remaining 
customers among the 350,000, who might experience fraudulent 
charges in the future.133 Relying on Clapper, neither inference 
demonstrated injury that was “concrete, particularized, and, if not 
actual, at least imminent.”134 While Judge Zagel found that potential 
future fraudulent charges were sufficiently “imminent” for standing, 
the injuries were not sufficiently concrete.135 Plaintiffs who suffered 
fraudulent charges did not allege that they were unreimbursed, and 
therefore the charges for which plaintiffs were not financially 
responsible did not qualify as “concrete” injuries.136 
Additionally, Judge Zagel was not persuaded that the customers 
were at a “certainly impending risk of identity theft.” The fact that 
9200 Plaintiffs had incurred fraudulent charges on their credit cards 
only supported an inference that their credit card information was 
stolen.137 While this placed the remaining Plaintiffs at a “certainly 
impending” risk of incurring fraudulent charges themselves, Judge 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
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Zagel held that this did not render Plaintiffs at “certainly impending” 
risk of suffering future identity theft.138 
Judge Zagel dispensed with the Plaintiffs’ other alleged injuries, 
finding none of them to be sufficient to confer standing.139 Plaintiffs 
alleged that time and money allegedly spent to mitigate risk of future 
fraudulent charges and identity theft constituted injury that conferred 
standing.140 Citing Moyer, Judge Zagel noted that the costs of 
guarding against a risked future injury only confer standing when the 
underlying injury the plaintiff is trying to avoid “is itself a cognizable 
Article III injury.”141 Judge Zagel argued that the allegations regarding 
what was done to mitigate future risk were insufficient, and the steps 
normally taken when fraudulent charges appear (reimbursement and 
new card issuance) don’t rise above a de minimis injury.142 Further, 
Judge Zagel reiterated that the complaint did not adequately allege the 
risk of identity theft that was sufficiently imminent, and therefore, the 
efforts to mitigate are not cognizable Article III injuries.143 
Plaintiffs also claimed that they suffered injury in that they paid a 
premium purchase price for retail goods at the Defendant’s stores, a 
portion of which the Defendant was required to use for data breach 
protection services.144 In other words, the Plaintiffs’ theory was 
because they overpaid, they suffered financial injuries.145 Judge Zagel 
held that Plaintiffs relied on case law that found injury when the value-
reducing injury was “intrinsic to the product at issue.”146 Here, 
                                                 
138 Id. at *3–4. 
139 Id. at *4–5. 
140 Id. at *4. 
141 Id. (citing Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 WL 
3511500, at *4 n.1 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014)).   
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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however, “the deficiency complained of is extrinsic to the product” 
and therefore is a meaningless theory of injury.147 
Finally, Judge Zagel addressed Plaintiffs’ alleged injury due to 
“loss of control over and value of their private information.” 148 Citing 
Barnes & Noble, Judge Zagel held that the injury as pled was not 
sufficiently concrete.149  
 
D.  The Seventh Circuit’s Decision 
 
Chief Judge Wood, joined by Judge Kanne and Judge Tinder, 
reversed the District Court’s decision, finding that the plaintiffs had 
plausibly alleged Article III standing.150 The case was reviewed de 
novo, consistent with the court’s precedent.151 The court analyzed both 
the requirements of Article III standing and, more briefly, Neiman 
Marcus’s argument that the complaint should be dismissed for failure 
to state a claim.152 
The court addressed the Plaintiffs’ imminent and actual injuries as 
pled.153 The two imminent injuries included: first, an increased risk of 
future fraudulent charges and second, greater susceptibility to identity 
theft. The four actual injuries included:  
 
1) lost time and money resolving the fraudulent charges, 2) 
lost time and money protecting themselves against future 
identity theft, 3) the financial loss of buying items at Neiman 
Marcus that they would not have purchased had they known 
                                                 
147 Id. at *5. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at *5 (citing In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litigation, No. 12–cv–8617, 
2013 WL 4759588, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013) (finding no actual injury where 
plaintiffs did not allege that their personal information was sold or that the plaintiffs 
themselves could have sold it)). 
150 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2015).  
151 Id. at 691 (citing Reid L. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 358 F.3d 511, 515 (7th 
Cir. 2004)).  
152 Id. at 692. 
153 Id. 
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of the store’s careless approach to cybersecurity, and 4) lost 
control over the value of their personal information.154 
 
With regard to Plaintiffs’ four alleged injuries, Chief Judge Wood 
noted that the allegations went “far beyond” allegations in Spokeo, 
therefore differentiating the injuries alleged here from the injuries 
alleged to have resulted from the publication of inaccurate information 
on a website.155  
The Seventh Circuit, relying on Supreme Court precedent in 
Clapper, noted that Article III standing requires that the injury have 
already occurred or be “certainly impending.”156 Chief Judge Wood 
summarized the injuries alleged: that each Plaintiff’s personal data had 
been stolen; that, of the 350,000 customers, 9200 incurred fraudulent 
charges and experienced harm; that the 9200 suffered the “aggravation 
and loss of value of the time needed to set things straight”; and that the 
remaining customers suffered a concrete risk of similar harm.157 Chief 
Judge Wood identified the question as whether one of the following 
conditions was met under Clapper: either the harm had already 
occurred, or it was “certainly impending.”158 
Disagreeing with the district court’s interpretation of Clapper’s 
precedent, Chief Judge Wood held that Clapper did not “foreclose any 
use whatsoever of future injuries to support Article III standing.”159 
With Clapper, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff human rights 
organizations did not have standing to challenge the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act because plaintiffs only suspected that 
interceptions of their communications with suspected terrorists might 
have occurred, not that any such interceptions did occur.160 These 
suspicions were too speculative for the purposes of establishing Article 
                                                 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 693. 
160 Id. 
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III standing.161 Chief Judge Wood went on to quote Clapper, clarifying 
that plaintiffs are not charged with demonstrating that they are 
“literally certain that the harms they identify will come about . . . [and] 
we have found standing based on a ‘substantial risk’ that harm will 
occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to 
mitigate or avoid that harm.”162  
Chief Judge Wood cited to another district court that found that 
substantial risk sufficed for Article III standing in a data breach case in 
which that court held that “the risk that Plaintiffs’ personal data will be 
misused by the hackers who breached Adobe’s network is immediate 
and very real.”163 Unlike in Clapper, where plaintiffs could only 
speculate as to whether their communications had been intercepted, 
here the plaintiffs’ information was stolen.164 Chief Judge Wood 
argued that Plaintiffs here should not have to wait for hackers to act on 
their personal information, either by running up fraudulent charges on 
their credit cards or by committing identity theft.165  
 Chief Judge Wood further argued that the very fact of the hack 
made it plausible to infer that Plaintiffs had shown a substantial risk of 
harm, as it was reasonably assumed that the purpose of the hack was 
“to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’ identities.”166 
 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S FINDING OF ARTICLE III STANDING COMPORTS 
WITH PRECEDENT AND CONSISTENCY 
 
The Seventh Circuit rested its opinion on a clear distinction 
between the facts in Remijas and Clapper. In Clapper, the Supreme 
Court held that possible future injuries did not satisfy the “certainly 
                                                 
161 Id. 
162 Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 
(2013)). 
163 Id. (citing In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014)). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
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impending” standard required to insure that injuries are not too 
speculative for Article III purposes.167 The Seventh Circuit held that 
the district court had both misapplied Clapper and improperly read out 
the idea that “substantial risk” of future injury was also available to 
support standing.168 Indeed, just one year after Clapper, the Supreme 
Court held that an allegation of future injury could suffice if the 
threatened injury was “certainly impending” or there was a 
“substantial risk” that harm would occur in the future.169 Therefore, 
there is no question that the substantial risk standard that the Seventh 
Circuit used to assess injury in fact as alleged in Remijas was 
appropriate. 
While multiple federal appellate courts have addressed data 
breaches, including the Eleventh, Ninth, Third, and First Circuits, only 
the Seventh Circuit has applied Clapper in a data breach case. The 
Seventh Circuit recently applied its own precedent in Lewert v. P.F. 
Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., a case in which the plaintiffs alleged future 
and present injuries following a computer system breach in which 
consumer credit card information was stolen.170 The Seventh Circuit 
held that increased risk of fraudulent charges and identity theft were 
plausible future injuries because the data had already been stolen.171 
The plaintiffs also successfully alleged present injuries, including 
fraudulent charges, and time and effort mitigating charges and 
preventing future fraud.172 
In a recent data breach case at the district court level, the District 
Court of Maryland argued that courts generally find that the increased 
risk of identity theft without evidence of actual theft of personal 
                                                 
167 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. 
168 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. 
169 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (citing 
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147, 1150 n.5). 
170 No. 14–3700, 2016 WL 1459226 at *1 (7th Cir. 2016). 
171 Id. at *3. 
172 Id. 
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information does not confer standing.173 The court cited to Remijas 
and Krottner as examples of cases in which the facts supported 
standing, because “allegations included either actual examples of the 
use of the fruits of the data breach for identity theft, even if involving 
victims other than the named plaintiffs, or a clear indication that the 
data breach was for the purpose of using the plaintiffs' personal data to 
engage in identity fraud.”174 The majority of district courts have found 
no standing in the absence of specific incidents or evidence of intent to 
use stolen information.175  Remijas therefore fits well within the 
majority approach. 
Future implications of the above-discussed approach are great as 
data breaches continue to occur, and more lawsuits follow. In March 
2016, a student filed a class action lawsuit against the University of 
Central Florida, alleging negligence that allowed hackers to store 
personal information of more than 60,000 students and faculty.176 Had 
the plaintiffs alleged identity theft, per Eleventh Circuit precedent, the 
plaintiffs could have successfully alleged Article III standing.177 This 
case was voluntarily dismissed,178 but such cases are likely to continue 
to arise, as personally identifiable information is increasingly stored 
online by schools, employers, hospitals, and other goods and services 
providers with varying degrees of protection. 
Remijas also fits well within Spokeo, which reiterated that 
concreteness is an essential element of the injury in fact requirement.  
Spokeo has raised numerous questions for litigants regarding how 
statutorily created harms interact with Article III standing, but the 
Court did not disturb precedent regarding concreteness. Per Spokeo, an 
                                                 
173 Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health System, No. TDC-15-2125, 2016 WL 
2946165, *9 (D. Md. May 19, 2016). 
174 Id. at *4. 
175 In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp.3d 949, 955 (D. Nev. 2015) (listing 
post-Clapper cases). 
176 Complaint, Heller v. Univ. of Cent. Fla. Bd. of Trs., No. 6:16-cv-396, 2016 
WL 887470 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2016). 
177 See Resnick v. Avmed Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2012). 
178 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, Heller v. Univ. of Cent. 
Fla. Bd. of Trs., No. 6:16-cv-396, 2016 WL 887470 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2016). 
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injury need not be tangible to be concrete,179 which is critical for data 
breach victims, whose injuries will generally be intangible. 
Several federal appellate courts have dealt with Spokeo in recent 
decisions, scrutinizing plaintiffs’ alleged harms more closely.  In 
Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
drew a distinction between bare procedural harms and harms like those 
suffered by data breach victims and noted that the plaintiffs had 
asserted only “a bare violation of the requirements of D.C. law[,]” as 
opposed to “any invasion of privacy, increased risk of fraud or identity 
theft.” 180 In a case involving alleged violations of disclosure 
requirements of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that the plaintiff had satisfied Article III standing 
requirements, as the harms she alleged were intangible but “real.”181 
These opinions make clear that Remijas did not overreach or 
overextend Article III standing and was correctly decided. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on a case in which actual fraud 
has occurred in the wake of a data breach. Given the standards 
articulated for Article III standing, requiring that injuries be “certainly 
impending” and sufficiently concrete, the Seventh Circuit’s recent 
opinion in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus, LLC was correctly reached. The 
Seventh Circuit followed Supreme Court reasoning on Article III 
standing to find that actual injury had been sufficiently alleged in 
Remijas. When faced with similar facts, other federal courts of appeal 
should adopt this approach and find that fraudulent activity following 
a data breach constitutes injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III 
standing. In cases where data breaches do not result in any known 
                                                 
179 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 
180 Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., No. 14-7047, 2016 WL 3996710, at *6-7 
(D.C. Cir. July 26, 2016) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo thus closes the 
door on [plaintiffs’] claim that the Stores’ mere request for a zip code, standing 
alone, amounted to an Article III injury.”) 
181 Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., No. 15-15708, 2016 WL 3611543 at *9 
(11th Cir. July 6, 2016). 
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fraudulent activity, and where plaintiffs are unsure if the information 
was used at all, Remijas is likely to be less helpful for plaintiffs. With 
Remijas, the Seventh Circuit merely recognized that fraudulent 
activity makes identity theft and future fraudulent charges more likely, 
removing a single, but critical, barrier for plaintiffs seeking relief in 
court. 
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